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EXCLUSIVE TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS
UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS-
A REAPPRAISAL
RICHARD E. DAY*
The federal antitrust laws, their application and interpretation by
the courts and the Federal Trade Commission, often present to the
uninitiated an abstruse image of utter confusion. The fault for this
happenstance all too often lies not with the unsophisticated observer,
but with the courts, the Commission and the lawyers who advise
them by their legal writings, arguments and briefs. An example of
the confusion which can be created by unclear and imprecise think-
ing is found under the heading of "exclusive territorial arrange-
ments." In reviewing the decisions in this area it indeed appears
that, as in the related problem of exclusive dealing under the Clayton
Act, the courts and the Commission are too often "using prior cases
as a drunkard uses a lamppost, for support rather than illumina-
tion."'  While a thorough reappraisal is long overdue, space here
permits only a broad-brush sketch of the law relating to exclusive
territorial arrangements as it now stands, with the writer's own
suggestions for guideposts to harmonize the interests of business
and the public within the framework of our national antitrust
policies.'
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrange-
ments Under the Clayton Act, 1961 SuprREME COURT REVIEW 267, 290. Ex-
clusive dealing arrangements having the effect of restricting the buyer to
dealing in the seller's goods to the exclusion of competitor's goods are beyond
the scope of this article. Such practices are specifically governed by the
Clayton Act, § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958), which provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for the sale of goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities, whether
patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular
possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix
a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on
the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser there-
of shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, sup-
plies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or
seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condi-
tion, tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." This section does
not apply to territorial restrictions.
'A review of prior writings discloses that virtually every writer on the
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Initially, some fundamental marketing concepts should be kept in
mind for an appreciation of the law as applied to differing factual
situations. In our complex economy the distribution functions are
traditionally performed by independent wholesalers or retailers, or
both. By thus leaving the distribution of his product to independent
'specialists the manufacturer is free to concentrate his capital and
energies on the manufacturing processes. His sales activities are
normally limited to promoting his initial sale to the first link in his
chosen chain of distribution, with perhaps some national advertising
and local co-operative and missionary work. One of the main dis-
advantages of this method of distribution is that the manufacturer
loses control of the distribution of his product once he has sold it;
subject of exclusive territorial arrangements believes that such distribution
arrangements are valid if they do not constitute an attempt to monopolize
or do not unreasonably lessen competition. See, e.g., HALE & HALE, MARET
POWER: SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT 39-41 (1958);
HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE (1957); REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
'GENERAL'S NATIONAL COKiMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 27(1955) ; Breckenridge, Some Phases of the Texas Antitrust Law, 4 TEXAS
L. REV. 129, 140-42 (1926); Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41
RARY. L. REV. 945, 995-96 (1928); Hale, Control Over Distribution:
Monopoly Aspects of Restraints Upon Distributors and Producers, 14 Miss.
L.J. 170, 181-84 (1942); Handler, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law,
59 COLUM. L. REV. 843, 866-70 (1959); Handler, Annual Review of Anti-
trust Developments, 10 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 378-79 (1956); Kramer, How
to Comply with the Clayton Act: The Problems of Small Business, in NEW
YORK STATE BAR Ass'N, 1959 ANTITRUST LAW Symnposlu 125, 132-34(1959); Lewis, Orderly Marketing and the Small Businessman, 16 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST SECTION 73, 77-80 (1960); Robinson, Restraints on Trade and
the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 254, 268 (1960); Sey-
mour, Some Aspects of Express Contracts and the Sherman Act, in NEW
YORK STATE BAR Ass'N, 1958 ANTITRUST LAW SYmpOSium 11-16; Thomp-
son, A Policy Against Undue Limitations on Competitive Conditions, 1955
A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 34, 39-40; Note, The Exclusive Agency System:
A Problem in Illegality, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 838, 845 (1927); Note, Re-
stricted Channels of Distributions Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. REV.
795 (1962); Comment, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Automobile Industry,
34 ILL. L. REv. 956, 959-60 (1940); Comment, Government Regulation of
Automobile Dealer Franchises, 3 WAYNE L. REV. 206, 215-16 (1957). Cf.
Baker, Exclusive Territorial Dealerships, Resale Price Control and Related
Problems, 39 CHICAGO BAR REcoRD 343, 346-53 (1958) ; Rifkind, Division of
Territories, in How TO COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 127 (Van Cise
& Dunn 1954); Note, The Resurgence of the Exclusive Territorial Dis-
tributorship as an Antitrust Problem, 40 MINN. L. REV. 853 (1956); Address
by Rufus E. Wilson, The Federal Bar Association and The Foundation of
the Federal Bar Associaiton Briefing Conference on Antitrust Laws and
Trade Regulations, January 5, 1962. See also Hearings on H.R. 528, H.R.
2688, and H.R. 6544 Before the Subcommittee on Automobile Marketing
Legislation of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 95-105 (1955).
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his only guarantee of effective distribution of his product being his
initial choice of distributors.
Assuming a manufacturer has sufficient resources, he may choose
to sell his product to the ultimate consumer without any help from
others than his own employees or agents. In such case, he would
have to assume all risks and costs of performing the functions of dis-
tribution, including shipment to and interim storage at various
points of sale throughout his marketing area. He would have to
provide for all necessary retail outlets with adequate facilities and
personnel for promotion, display and, perhaps, servicing and repair-
ing products sold. In addition to any national advertising he might
undertake he would have to bear the burden of promoting the
product locally.
This expansion by a manufacturer forward toward the ultimate
consumer is commonly referred to as "vertical integration," or more
precisely, "forward integration." In addition to internal expansion
forward, the manufacturer might expand by the merger route,
through the acquisition of the stock or assets of one or more dis-
tributors or retailers.3 Whatever manner of forward integration or
combination thereof is employed, this method has the advantage for
the manufacturer of retaining control of the distribution of his
product, thereby insuring that it receives adequate promotion and
market coverage.
It may be that the manufacturer does not have sufficient financial
or technical resources to integrate forward by internal growth or by
merger-or, perhaps, having such resources he may decide that it
would be more beneficial to utilize independent distributors and
retailers. In an effort to obtain the economy, efficiency and flexi-
bility of independent distributors, and at the same time to assure
that all competitive effort is directed toward competing products
(inter-brand competition), and not turned within toward its own
product (intra-brand competition), the manufacturer may adopt one
or a combination of several contractual arrangements with his inde-
' Mergers are governed by the special provisions of the Clayton Act, § 7,
.64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), reading, in part: "No corpora-
tion engaging in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or
any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a
monopoly."
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pendent distributors.' One such method might be to prevent intra-
brand price competition through the use of resale price maintenance
covenants.5 One serious limitation to this plan is that it still leaves
all non-price weapons (viz., services, terms of sale, etc.), freely avail-
able for intra-brand competition. In addition, by restricting any
method of competition-price or non-price-the manufacturer ham-
strings his distributors in their inter-brand competition and deprives
them of needed flexibility to compete successfully with rival brands.
Thus, such contractual restrictions might well prove self-defeating
in his efforts vis-A-vis competing brands.
Better tools for concentration on inter-brand competition are
found in exclusive territorial arrangements, i.e., exclusive selling,
closed territories and geographical customer allocation. By "ex-
clusive selling," the manufacturer assigns an exclusive territory to
his distributor, and does not sell to anyone else within the dis-
tributor's designated territory. The distributor in turn treats his
assigned territory as his "primary zone of influence" and attempts to
develop it to its fullest potential. This arrangement gives the manu-
facturer some assurance that the distributor will devote his energies
to promoting his product within his "zone" and, by a series of such
strategically located exclusive dealers, he can gain needed market
coverage. This arrangement does not prevent the distributor from
selling outside his territory, but proper location of distributors to
conform to natural marketing areas alleviates intra-brand "border
clashes" through the natural barrier of proximity. By reducing
' See Kessler & Stem, Competition, Contract and Vertical Integration, 69
YALE L.J. 2-21 (1959).
Vertical resale price maintenance was early held to violate the Sherman
Act, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911), and the Federal Trade Commission Act, FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing
Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922). Such practices may be legal if resulting from
the manufacturer's unilateral refusal to deal with those who cut prices,
provided no co-operation or coercion of intermediate distributors or dealers
is involved. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). Cf.
FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., supra; George W. Warner & Co. v. Black
& Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1960). See also United States
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 353 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v. Bausch &
Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Oppenheim, The Parke Davis
Decision: Colgate's Permissible Suggested Resale Price Policy is Neither
Dead Nor Sterile, 17 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTIO N 215 (1960); Turner, The
Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelismn, and
Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. Rnv. 655, 703-04 (1962). Resale price main-
tenance may be exempt from the antitrust laws where pursuant to valid state
Fair Trade laws under the federal enabling acts. 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1958) ; 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
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intra-brand competition, the distributor is more willing to invest
in promoting the seller's product, free from fear of intra-brand
cannibalism.
In order to further reduce the problem of intra-brand competition,
the manufacturer might inaugurate "closed territories." Under this
plan, the distributor is prohibited from promoting or selling in an-
other's "closed" territory. This arrangement eliminates all intra-
brand competition within the designated closed territories, but leaves
the possibility of intra-brand competition between closed territories.
Thus, a buyer from one territory still might enter and make a pur-
chase in a different territory, or even arrange a purchase in a differ-
ent territory by correspondence, with delivery f.o.b. distributor.
This latter loop-hole may be closed by still a third arrangement-
"geographical customer allocation." Under this plan, each dis-
tributor is prohibited from selling to anyone who does not reside
or have a place of business within his territory. Thus, if a purchaser
hould attempt to buy outside of the zone in which he resides or
maintains a place of business, the distributor would have to decline
the sale. Variations on this plan, to retain customer good-will and
make up for inadvertent oversights, include providing for reim-
bursing the offended distributor for the loss of profit from the im-
proper sale, in addition to any expected expense which may be in-
curred by him, such as servicing or honoring warranties.
Customer allocation can, of course, be used to allocate to specific
distributors named customers or categories of customers classified
by criteria other than geographical. Thus, accounts may be classified
according to the purposes to which they place the product, the
type of servicing required, or the peculiar methods of sale necessary.
The manufacturer may also wish to reserve certain accounts to him-
self-which in a sense is what happens when customers are geograph-
ically allocated inasmuch as he is the only one who can make sales
to distributors in all territories.
Each of these three arrangements could be undertaken separately
or in combination. For example, where geographical customer allo-
cation is used alone, presumably a dealer could promote and sell out-
side his territory so long as the buyer in fact resided or had his place
of business within the seller's assigned territory. Conversely, though
the promotion and sale are made in a dealer's territory, if it should
turn out that the buyer is from a different territory, then the seller
1962]
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must decline to make the sale or perhaps reimburse the dealer in
whose territory the buyer in fact resides. In practice the three
arrangements would normally be used concurrently so that each
of the former would be included as elements of the more restrictive
provisions of the latter, as progressive steps in eliminating intra-
brand competition.
Each of these territorial arrangements may result from an agree-
ment or understanding between the parties, or by the seller's recog-
nized right of customer selection and unilateral refusal to deal."
Under the latter method, the seller may simply carry out a policy
of exclusive selling by unilaterally refusing to deal with more than
the designated dealer in a particular territory. Similarly, the seller
may enforce closed territories or geographical customer allocations
by unilaterally refusing to deal with those who do not voluntarily
acquiesce in his pre-announced policy. As a consequence of the
differing means for accomplishing the various exclusive marketing
arrangements, the courts have followed two lines of reasoning in
determining the legality of the arrangements.
Where the policy is executed and enforced through the manu-
facturer's unilateral refusal to deal, and no question is raised of a
contract, combination or conspiracy, monopolization or an attempt to
monopolize thereby, the practice is beyond antitrust proscriptions.'
Nor does the fact that the seller chooses to adopt such a policy at the
instance of the buyer alter the legality of such a unilateral determina-
tion on the part of the seller.' It is where the restriction is accom-
plished by agreement-tacit or express-that serious antitrust ques-
tions may arise. It is to this latter area that the remainder of this
article is addressed.
With these basic concepts in mind, an attempt shall be made to
reappraise the past and present status of each of the three types of
exclusive territorial arrangements, i.e., exclusive selling, closed
See authorities cited note 5 supra. See also FTC v. Raymond Bros.-
Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924). Cf. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
359 U.S. 207 (1959); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143
(1951); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941).
' See authorities cited notes 5 and 6 supra.
8
"Such decisions are not made in a vacuum." Schwing Motor Co. v.
Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899, 906 (D. Md.), aff'd per curian, 239
F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957). In fact, "it
is likely to be the dealer who asks for it." Packard Motor Car Co. v.




territories and geographical customer allocation, under the Sherman
Act' and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.' °
EXCLUSIVE SELLING
Almost two centuries before the enactment of the Sherman Act
the common law developed, as an exception to the general rule that
contracts in restraint of the right to engage in business or trade are-
void, the doctrine that certain ancillary restrictions are legal where
reasonable under the circumstances to promote a lawful main pur-
026 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958). The substantive pro--
visions, §§ 1 and 2, of this act provide: Section 1. "Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade-
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal .... Every person who shall make any contract or-
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall'
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be:
punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the.
court."
Section 2. "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopo-
lize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize-
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall:
be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment
not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of'
the court."
1038 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C.
§45(a)(1) (1958), reading in part: "Unfair methods of competition in,
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby
declared unlawful." The Supreme Court has noted that the Federal Trade.
Commission Act is all-inclusive and that "minimally that section [§ 5 of the-
FTC Act] registers violations of the Clayton and Sherman Acts." Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609 (1953). Just
how far beyond this "minimal" coverage the FTC Act goes is not yet clear
The outer limits indeed may extend far if the Commission is given its head
as the Supreme Court indicated that it would in FTC v. Motion Picture-
Advertising Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953), where it stated that the FTC Act-
was "designed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton
Act... to stop in their incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown,
would violate those acts . . . as well as to condemn as 'unfair methods of-
competition' existing violations of them." Such an incipient incipiency doc-
trine portends unlimited expansion of FTC proscriptions of ominous scope,
especially in view of Parkinson's Law under which "administrative decisionsZ
tend to feed upon themselves for their enlargement, and that, under the-
guise of the interstitial interpretation of the act which creates it, the admin-
istrative agency by its decisions tends to expand the authority originally
given to it." Butler, Federal Trade Commission Jurisdiction Under the-
Incipiency Doctrine, LEcTuREs ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 154, 173
(University of Michigan Law School Summer Institute 1953). See also.
Oppenheim, Harmonization of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission-
Act with the Sherinan and Clayton Acts, 17 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEcTIoN
231 (1960).
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pose." In United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 12  Judge
Taft (later Chief Justice) recognized this doctrine of ancillary
restraints in his classic review of the common law authorities prior
to the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court subsequently adopted the
reasoning of Judge Taft in applying the Rule of Reason to ancillary
restraints of trade.13
The protectable interest of the buyer in exclusive selling agree-
ments was recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. 4 Although the Court there struck
down an elaborate distribution scheme designed to fix resale prices,
it let stand a separate arrangement giving the distribtuor, Soft-Lite,
the exclusive right to sell pink-tinted lenses manufactured by de-
fendant. In the district court, Judge Rifkind, in holding that tliis
exclusive selling agreement did not violate section 1 of the Sherman
Act, stated :'-
" In the celebrated case of Mitchel v. Reynold, 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng.
Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711), the court upheld an agreement not to practice a trade
ancillary to the sale of a business on the ground that the restraint imposed
was reasonable to protect the interests of the purchaser in seeing that the
value of his purchase was not diminished by continued competition of his
seller. Typical of the types of ancillary restraints upheld by the common
law as reasonably necessary to protect a lawful main purpose include, in
addition to such agreements of the seller of a business not to compete with
the business sold, the agreement of a participant in a joint venture not
to compete with that venture, and covenants not to compete with a former
employer. See Blake, Preventing Competition by a Former Employee, 15
A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEcTioN 235 (1959); Bork, Ancillary Restraints and
the Sherman Act, id. at 211.
" 85 Fed. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
"Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 498 (1940); Standard
Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51 (1911). For the
historical development of the Rule of Reason, see Bork, supra note 11. A
concise restatement of the theory of ancillary restraints is found in United
States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1960):
"The doctrine of ancillary restraint ... permits, as reasonable, a restraint
which (1) is reasonably necessary to the legitimate primary purpose of the
arrangement, and of no broader scope than reasonably necessary; (2) does
not unreasonably affect competition in the marketplace; and (3) is not im-
posed by a party or parties with monopoly power."
"445 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd as modified, 321 U.S. 707
(1944).
"Id. at 398-99. See also Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204
F.2d 331, 335 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 994 (1953): "[T]he
Sherman Act was not violated, because the manufacturer had no monopoly
of the product, and the 'restraint of trade' was (a) ancillary to a reasonable
main purpose-a source of supply to the distributor-and (b) fairly protective
of that distributor's interests but not so large as to interfere with the
interests of the public."
[Vol. 40
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[T]he main purpose of the contract is to provide a source of
supply for Soft-Lite. The restraining covenant is for the pro-
tection of the purchaser who is spending large sums to de-
velop his good will and enlarge the public patronage of a rela-
tively new article of commerce. The arrangement, though not
a partnership in legal form, is functionally a joint enterprise
in which one will produce and the other market the com-
modity.
The district court also noted that not only were there other com-
peting lenses in the market, but that competition had actually in-
creased by competitors' emulation of the success of Soft-Lite in its
promotion of defendant's product.1" Since Bausch & Lomb, courts
have generally assumed such exclusive selling agreements to be
legal, absent monopolization or an attempt to monopolize.l1
The legality of exclusive selling arrangements was recently re-
viewed at length in two private antitrust treble damage actions
brought by automobile dealers on the ground that they had been
disfranchised as a result of allegedly illegal exclusive selling agree-
ments.
Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp." involved treble
damage actions under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by two
franchised dealers for Hudson cars in Baltimore who alleged that
their dealerships had been terminated in favor of granting an ex-
clusive franchise to another dealer in the Baltimore area. Chief
Judge Thomsen recognized that every manufacturer has a "natural
and complete monopoly" of his own brand and that such an exclusive
selling agreement would of necessity involve a "limited monopoly"
1645 F. Supp. at 399.
'
7 For example, in United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp.
504, 544-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), enforcement decreed, 105 F. Supp. 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), an international cartel case, the court termed exclusive
distributing agreements not employed in furtherance of a conspiracy to be
an "ordinary" business practice, entirely lawful absent a showing of illegal
purpose. For a review of earlier federal and state cases, see note 2 supra.
See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 516(e) (1932): "A bargain to deal
exclusively with another" is one instance of a reasonable restraint of trade
unless "part of a plan to effect a monopoly." Texas provides an outstanding
exception to the general acceptance of exclusive selling as an "ordinary"
business practice, and prohibits all territorial restrictions under the state
antitrust act. See Climatic Air Distrib. of South Texas v. Climatic Air
Sales, Inc., 1961 Trade Cas. 69,991 (Sup. Ct. Tex.).
"' 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
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in the exclusive distributor to sell the manufacturer's product within
the defined territory.' 9 Nevertheless, the court dismissed the com-
plaint for failure to state a cause of action, pointing out that such an
arrangement is not invalid where it is not used as a means of violating
the antitrust laws, and where neither the manufacturer nor the ex-
clusive distributor was shown to have "dominated" the market in
automobiles either in the Baltimore area or elsewhere." Judge
Thomsen properly emphasized the distinction between a "real"
monopoly in the relevant line of commerce and the "natural"
monopoly which each manufacturer has in the product which he
manufactures under his own brand. The latter may, of course, merge
into the former where the manufacturer "dominates" the market,
but absent this market domination, Judge Thomsen would permit
the manufacturer to grant a dealer an "actual" monopoly in his
brand or make in a defined territory. Any control over the price
of the manufacturer's product in such an instance must be limited
by the necessity to compete with rival brands. Where there is active
inter-brand competition the Rule of Reason dictates that such ex-
clusive agency agreements should be upheld, and the court so held.
Packard Motor Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co.2 1 presented a
factual situation similar to Schwing; it was also a treble damage
action brought by a disfranchised automobile dealer against a manu-
facturer for alleged violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
Prior to the decision in Schwing, the district court entered judgment
for the plaintiff after a trial. Chief Judge Edgerton, writing for
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, adopted the
reasoning in Schwing in reversing the lower court's judgment.
As in Schwing, the court of appeals applied the "reasonable inter-
changeability" test of the Cellophane case, United States v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 22 finding that Packard automobiles were
reasonably interchangeable by consumers with other makes and
concluding that the relevant line of commerce must therefore be
"automobiles," and not merely "Packards."2 3 The court found no
evidence of any attempt of conspiracy to monopolize the market so
defined, and concluded :24
"Id. at 902-03. 2Ibid.
" 135 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1955), rev'd, 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
"351 U.S. 377 (1956). 243 F.2d at 420. "Id. at 420-21.
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When an exclusive dealership "is not part and parcel of a
scheme to monopolize and effective competition exists at both
the seller and buyer levels, the arrangement has invariably
been upheld as a reasonable restraint of trade. In short, the
rule was virtually one of per se legality .... The fact that
any other dealers in the same product of the same manu-
facturer are eliminated does not make an exclusive dealership
illegal; it is the essential nature of the arrangement.
The courts in both Schwing and Packard found no monopoliza-
tion or attempt to monopolize, noted that there was effective compe-
tion at both the buyer and seller levels, and contrasted the vertical
agreements involved in exclusive selling with restrictive horizontal
agreements between competitors. Neither court was impressed
with the plaintiffs' emphases on the fact that the manufacturer in
each case had agreed to establish the exclusive selling arrangement
at the instance of the favored dealer.25  Thus, once the exclusive
selling arrangement is found to be free of illegal purpose or effect,
it should make no difference whether it is instituted and enforced
by mere unilateral refusal to deal on the part of the manufacturer, or
by agreement at the instance of the buyer or seller.2"a
More recently, in Reliable Volkswagen S. & S. Co. v. World-
Wide-Auto Corp.,26 a dealer alleged nine causes of action against the
foreign manufacturer, its exclusive importer, a distributor, two
,dealers, and two individuals (officers and directors of the distrib-
-utor). The complaint charged, inter alia, a violation of sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by an alleged conspiracy of defendants
to create a monopoly in the retail sale of Volkswagen products for
the distributor and its two retail dealers in Connecticut, New Jersey
and New York, pursuant to which defendants allegedly "eliminated"
retail Volkswagen dealers therein, specifically plaintiff dealer, by
.exclusive selling arrangements.
On consideration of a motion to dismiss this count, the court
noted that, whereas in Schwing and Packard, the relevant market
2 Note 8 supra.
" Justice Harlan, dissenting in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
30 U.S.L. WEEK 4146, 4152 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1962), referred to the right of a
ananufacturer to transfer an "exclusive distributorship" from one dealer to an-
other and concluded that this right "is preserved under the antitrust laws not
.only because of its unilateral decision, but because it does not amount to an
-unreasonable restraint of trade in any meaningful sense of the term ..
" 182 F. Supp. 412 (D.N.J. 1960).
:19621
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was determined to be "automobiles," the relevant market in Reliable
was not certain. In addition the court adverted that the virtually
per se legality of the manufacturer-dealer arrangement in Schwing
and Packard was limited to a competitive market free of monopoly."'
Unlike Schwing and Packard the complaint in Reliable charged
a conspiracy to create a "retail" monopoly in Volkswagen products
for the tri-state area in the distributor and dealer defendants. The
complaint also charged that the individual defendants were officers
and directors of the distributor and two dealer defendants, and that
the distributor acted for and carried out the orders and policies of
the foreign manufacturer and its exclusive importer. In view of
these allegations the court concluded that the legality of the exclusive
selling arrangement "must await evidence of its reasonableness."2"
In United States v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,30 decided by
Judge Forman on the same day as Reliable, the government charged
the defendant manufacturer, its exclusive importer and its fourteen
distributors with a combination and conspiracy in violation of section
3 of the Clayton Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act. In con-
sidering the defendants' motion to dismiss allegations of exclusive
territorial agreements the court declined to consider the merit of the
defendants' contention that such arrangements were "legal per se,"
and agreed with the government's argument that regardless of their
legality when considered alone, they would be illegal if they are a
part of and promote an illegal price fixing scheme, as charged there.8"
Schwing and Packard were distinguished as not involving allega-
tions of price-fixing, "a practice long since denominated illegal per
se." 2 The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss, stating that
in the instant case questions for the jury were presented as to
whether the exclusive selling arrangements were designed to pro-
mote price maintenance, and if so, their utility in that regard.
The Federal Trade Commission has followed the courts in
27 Id. at 419. 2"8 d. at 420.29Id. at 421. 'o 182 F. Supp. 405 (D.N.J. 1960).
"
11d. at 411. The court quoted from Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U.S. 375, 396 (1905), wherein Justice Holmes held, "The constituent ele-
ments, as we have stated them, are enough to give the scheme a body and,
for all that we can say, to accomplish it. Moreover, whatever we may think
of them separately when we take them up as distinct charges, they are
alleged sufficiently as elements of the scheme. It is suggested that the
several acts charged are lawful. . . . But they are bound together as the
parts of a single plan. The plan may make the parts unlawful."
" 182 F. Supp. at 411.
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upholding exclusive selling arrangements. In Columbus Coated
Fabrics,33 respondent was charged with violating section 5 of the
FTC Act by (1) resale price fixing; (2) establishing and maintain-
ing exclusive sales territories for distributors; and (3) boycotting
certain dealers. While the hearing examiner treated the second
charge as involving closed territories, the Commission found them
in practice to involve only exclusive selling, noting that the dis-
tributors and dealers were free to sell wherever and to whomever
they pleased.3 4 The Commission affirmed the initial decision, dis-
missing the first two charges and issuing a cease and desist order
as to the third. The hearing examiner had found that the respond-
ent's product, "Wall-Tex" brand washable wall covering, was in
substantial competition with other similar products at the distributor
level and also with other dealers in the product at the retail level.
Thus, assuming an express understanding between respondent and
its distributors, the examiner 35 and the Commission36 followed the
reasoning of Schwing and Packard in noting that there was no evi-
dence of monopolization and that there was effective competition at
the buyer and seller levels.
CLOSED TERRITORIES
In contradistinction to the "virtual per se legal" status of ex-
clusive selling arrangements, closed territories and customer alloca-
tion arrangements have come in for much closer scrutiny by the
Department of Justice, the courts and the Commission. As already
noted, the purpose of an exclusive selling arrangement, whereby the
seller agrees to sell exclusively to a particular distributor in a desig-
nated area, may be defeated if other distributors should invade the
exclusive distributor's assigned territory. In order to prevent this,
and to insure the success of the exclusive arrangement in eliminating
intra-brand competition, the distributor's right to sell beyond his
exclusive territory must likewise be restricted. This paper makes
a distinction in kind between "closed territories" by which the
distributor is merely prevented from entering into another's territory
to promote and make sales, and "geographical customer allocation"
whereby the distributor is prevented from selling to anyone not
residing or maintaining a place of business within his assigned terri-
tory. While the extent of the restraint obviously differs in each
" 55 F.T.C. 1500 (1959).
31 Id. at 1521-22.
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of these two arrangements, the courts and the Commission have not
as yet recognized the distinction, generally treating them together
within the category of "closed territories.""7 The term "customer
allocation" has been limited to classification on a basis other than
geographical. Inasmuch as under the Rule of Reason the extent of
the ancillary restraint imposed must be reasonable to promote the
lawful main purpose of the arrangement, the difference in the effect
of these two arrangements might well control the outcome of a
particular case. For this reason, regardless of the name given by the
courts and the Commission to the arrangement involved in cases to
be discussed hereafter, they will be treated according to their cate-
gory as defined hereinabove.8
An early federal decision30 regarding closed territories involved
an action by the seller of cement for breach of contract. The pur-
chaser defended on the ground that the sales contract prohibited him
from shipping or selling the cement outside of Texas. In upholding
this restriction against a Sherman Act charge, the court emphasized
the fact that the defendant had no monopoly, was surrounded by
competing manufacturers, and that the restraint had no substantial
effect on competition at the buyer or seller levels.4" Other early
federal and state court decisions tended to assume the legality of
exclusive territory arrangements without making detailed analyses
or distinctions in their form, purposes, or effects.4'
Closed territories were treated as "virtually per se legal" by the
district court in Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp.42 On
" Cf. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 1961 Trade Cas.
70,039 (2d Cir.), where defendants contended the trial court had erred
in applying a per se rule to allocation of customers by competitors. The
court noted that competitors' territorial division of markets has been held
to be per se illegal and concluded that there was no "significant difference
between an allocation of customers and an allocation of territory." This
case is distinguishable from the question here at issue since it involved
horizontal agreements between competitors and, as already noted, horizontal
customer allocation is a greater restraint than horizontal geographical di-
vision of territories and since the latter is per se illegal, so is the former, a
fortiori.
88 Caveat: Because the courts and the Commission have not classified
cases within the categories used herein, the cases must necessarily be re-
classified according to the writer's own opinion based on a reading of facts
as disclosed in the decisions. Whether the courts or the Commission would
have agreed with the writer's classifications had they adopted the same cate-
gories is problematical.
" Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 125 Fed. 593 (8th Cir. 1903),
cert. denied, 192 U.S. 606 (1904).
,'Old. at 595. "' See note 2 supra.
' 37 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), aff'd, 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.), re-
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defendant's motion, the court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action, without considering affidavits filed on behalf
of the parties. Plaintiff Chevrolet dealer had been assigned a par-
ticular territory as its "zone of influence" and the complaint alleged
that defendants prohibited plaintiff from establishing a used car
outlet and from "solicitation, by mail or otherwise," beyond his
assigned territory.43 The court emphasized the "special relation"
that plaintiff dealer bore to defendants in using defendants' trade-
marks and good will in his business, and could find nothing un-
reasonable in defendants' preventing plaintiff from trading on de-
fendants' good will in areas assigned to others.4 According to the
court, "the solicitation of business in other areas might very well
conflict with the business of other dealers of Chevrolets and thus
adversely affect the business of defendants."'4 5
The district court's decision in Boro Hall presents a clear holding
on the legality of closed territories. The court of appeals in affirming
did not feel that it had to go as far as the district court by consider-
ing the defendants' affidavit. According to the court of appeals,
defendants' uncontradicted affidavit established that plaintiff was
prohibited only from establishing a used car outlet where it would
"unduly prejudice' its other Chevrolet dealers. The affidavit was
said to negative the allegation that plaintiff could sell only within
his "zone of influence."46  Thus, the more limited holding of the
court of appeals restricts its affirmance to the legality of what in
effect was an exclusive selling arrangement, presaging Schwing and
Packard. The result is that, aside from the untested district court
dicta in Boro Hall, there is no definitive federal court decision on
closed territories. One reason for the dearth of authority in this
area is the success of the Justice Department in getting manu-
facturers to agree to cease utilizing close territories and customer
allocation.4"
hearing denied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695(1943).
, 37 F. Supp. at 1000. 4" Id. at 1001.
'
5 Ibid. 48 124 F.2d at 823.
"" As a result of pressure from the Department of Justice in 1949, auto-
mobile manufacturers revised their franchise agreements to delete restrictions
on their dealers which inhibited them from operating outside their designated
territories. See Hearings on H.R. 528, H.R. 2688, and H.R. 6544 Before
the Subcommittee on Automobile Marketing Legislation of the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 89, 362(1956). Manufacturers succumbed in a series of consent decrees which,
while allowing exclusive selling, prohibit closed territories or customer allo-
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On the state level,4" the North Carolina Supreme Court recently
upheld closed territorial restraints imposed by an automobile manu-
facturer on one of its franchised dealers in Waldron Buick Co. v.
General Motors Corp.49  Plaintiff dealer sought treble damages
under the state antitrust law50 against General Motors and Folger,
another franchised Buick dealer, on the ground that defendants
had forced plaintiff to cease its sales activities within Folger's closed
territory, comprising the city of Charlotte and suburban areas im-
mediately adjacent thereto. Plaintiff had advertised in newspapers
and over the radio in Charlotte, and had employed salesmen and
"bird dogs"'" in Folger's closed territory. The court assumed for
purposes of its decision that plaintiff sustained "some loss" as a
cation. See United States v. American Linen Supply Co., 1956 Trade Cas.
68,542 (N.D. Il1.); United States v. J. P. Seeburg Corp., 1957 Trade Cas.
68,613 (N.D. Il.); United States v. AMI Inc., 1957 Trade Cas. 68,758
(W.D. Mich.); United States v. American Type Founders Co., 1958 Trade
Cas. 69,065 (D.N.J.) ; United States v. Audiofidelity, Inc., 1960 Trade Cas.
69,760 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Hambro Automotive Corp., 1960
Trade Cas. 69,620 (S.D.N.Y.) ; United States v. Necchi Sewing Machine
Sales Corp., 1958 Trade Cas. 168,957 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v.
Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 69,011 (W.D.N.Y.); United
States v. American Body & Trailer, Inc., 1958 Trade Cas. 69,063 (W.D.
Okla.); United States v. Philco Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. 68,409 (E.D. Pa.);
United States v. Bostitch, Inc., 1958 Trade Cas. 69,207 (D.R.I.). Current
Department of Justice activity is illustrated by its latest civil antitrust action,
Civil No. 7546, M.D. Pa., Feb. 9, 1962, against the York Corporation of Dela-
ware, a wholly owned subsidiary of Borg-Warner, charging it has violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act by allegedly requiring its distributors to agree
to contracts limiting both territories and customers, and forbidding the dis-
tributors to compete with York in selling Borg-Warner air-conditioning and
refrigeration equipment to the United States Government or for export or
marine use. Cf. pending criminal action in United States v. General Motors
Corp., Criminal No. 30132, S.D. Cal., Oct. 12, 1961.
8 As to the possible conflict between state antitrust legislation and the
federal antitrust acts, see Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust
Regidation, 61 CoLuA. L. REv. 1469 (1961).
"°254 N.C. 117, 118 S.E.2d 559 (1961).
"The North Carolina antitrust statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (1960),
follows the general format of section 1 of the Sherman Act, stating that
"every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or commerce in the State of North Carolina is hereby
declared to be illegal." The state act specifically provides, in § 75-5(b) (6),
that it is unlawful "while engaged in buying or selling any goods in this
State, to have any agreement or understanding, express or implied, with
any other person not to buy or sell such goods within certain territorial
limits within the State, with the intention of preventing competition in selling
or to fix the price or present competition in buying such goods within these
limits."
" A "bird dog" is "one with whom an arrangement is made to search out




result of the territorial restriction. 2 After approving the doctrine
of ancillary restraints as the applicable test,5 3 the court stated the
issue to be whether the closed territory arrangement between General
Motors and Folger was lawful. 4 Having by this oblique approach
read-out the alleged restraint on plaintiff as the controlling issue,
the court then upheld the arrangement between General Motors and
Folger as a reasonable restraint. Perhaps the court's misdirected
inquiry can be attributed to its inability to find an analogy in its
search for precedent. Grasping at straws, the court cited Schwing
and Packard as involving the same basic question. To fit the case
to the Procrustean bed of Sckwing and Packard, the court found
it necessary to judge the arrangement in light of its restraint on
General Motors,55 as in exclusive selling, rather than as a restraint
on plaintiff, as in closed territory arrangements-which, indeed, it
was.5
6
The Federal Trade Commission first had occasion to consider
the legality of closed territories under section 5 of the FTC Act in
1932 when, on stipulated facts, it dismissed without opinion the
complaint in General Cigar Co.57  Commissioner McCulloch filed
a vigorous dissent which set out the basic arguments opposed to the
use of closed territories. Respondent cigar manufacturer had as-
signed closed territories to forty-six independent wholesalers and
seventeen sales branches of its own. While there was no "formal
contract," the distributors accepted the territories as assigned and
co-operated with each other and with respondent to contain dis-
tributors' sales activities within their assigned territories." The
logic of Commissioner McCulloch's dissent proceeds briefly as fol-
lows: (1) an agreement between competitors to divide the market
constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act;59 (2) a series of vertical
2 Id. at 124, 118 S.E.2d at 565. '3 Id. at 126, 118 S.E.2d at 566.
Id, at 126-27, 118 S.E.2d at 567. Id. at 127, 118 S.E.2d at 567.
The restriction as described in the decision was clearly a closed terri-
tory arrangement, the court holding: "General Motors agreed that Folger
was to have exclusive rights in respect of selling and soliciting sales within
said Charlotte area. In this connection, it is noted that General Motors did
not impose or attempt to impose any restrictions on [plaintiff's] sales activi-
ties except within said Charlotte area, whether the prospect involved resided
in Charlotte or elsewhere." Id. at 125, 118 S.E.2d at 565. (Emphasis is by
the court.)
" 16 F.T.C. 537 (1932). Ibid.
" Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
But cf. United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp.
18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), appeal granted, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3225 (U.S. Jan. 16,
1962) (No. 583).
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agreements between a manufacturer and his distributors has the same
effect as horizontal agreements between competitors and therefore
stands on the same footing; (3) agreements having the effect of
fixing or stabilizing prices are per se illegal; (4) closed territorial
agreements are therefore per se illegal because all competition in
respondent's products is eliminated and the absence of competition
necessarily affects prices.
Almost three decades passed before the Commission again con-
sidered the legality of closed territories. The question was recently
presented in Snap-On Tools Corp."0 where it was alleged that re-
spondent manufacturer of a full line of tools had required its dealers
to enter into contracts which, inter alia, (1) established resale prices
for respondent's products; (2) restricted the territory within
which and the persons to whom the dealer could sell; and (3) pro-
vided that a dealer may not engage in a similar business within the
state for one year after termination of his dealership agreement.
At the close of the Commission's case-in-chief, the hearing ex-
aminer held that a prima facie case had been proved as to the charge
of resale price maintenance, but had not been made on the other
two charges. 6' According to the examiner the maintenance of closed
territories is not unlawful per se, and the Rule of Reason should be
applied to the facts in each case to determine whether the practice is
"reasonably likely" to have a substantial adverse effect on competi-
tion. Respondent marketed its products primarily through inde-
pendent "vendors on wheels," operating from walk-in trucks in which
they carried a stock of tools most frequently sold. The examiner
felt that giving these dealers a closed territory was the only way
that respondent could adequately develop the market, other than
through a large corps of its own employed salesmen. This practice
was said to assure that regular, periodic calls were made on the trade
with adequate service to customers and attention to their complaints.
The examiner emphasized the keen inter-brand competition and felt
that this fact attenuated any benefit denied purchasers by not being
able to "play off" one Snap-On dealer against another in an effort to
get a better price.
The Commission disagreed with the examiner's consideration of
the practices individually and felt that they should be considered
together as a single method of doing business. 2 So considered, the
"°No. 7116, FTC, November 1, 1961.
1 Opinion of the Commission, id. at p. 2.
" The Commission, on January 21, 1960, affirmed the examiner's order
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Commission held that the closed territory arrangement was part of
an over-all plan to eliminate competition between respondent's dealers
and thereby "buttressed" respondent's resale price maintenance.
3
The Commission stated that the practice of playing off one dealer
against the other was "the essence of competition," 64 disregarding
the extensive inter-brand competition found to exist by the examiner.
Packard and Schwing were distinguished as being exclusive selling
arrangements involving no restraint on the dealers. 5  Similarly,
Boro Hall was distinguished as not restricting the dealer in his sales
activities beyond his assigned territory, other than the restriction
on the location of his place of business.6 6 Lending its approval to
exclusive selling arrangements, the Commission suggested that
Snap-On might assign areas of primary responsibility to its dealers
and insist that they provide adequate sales coverage and service
within such territories.6 General Cigar was dispatched in a footnote
stating that the grounds of the decision are unclear in the absence
of a majority opinion and, without distinguishing it or overruling
it, commented that it had "little precedential significance now.
'
"6s
Whether or not the Commission would outlaw closed territories
when not found to be part of an illegal course of dealing is problem-
atical. The individual treatment of this practice in Snap-On presents
strong implication that it might.69
of October 5, 1959, as to resale price maintenance, but remanded on the other
two charges, directing the examiner to consider them in light of respondent's
over-all course of doing business, rather than individually. The examiner
in his second opinion of January 6, 1961, arrived at the same negative result,
concluding that these practices were not illegal when considered separately
and that they were not elements of an illegal plan. Finally, on the second
appeal, on November 1, 1961, the Commission reversed, holding that the
practices were illegal when considered as elements of respondent's method of
competition.
" No. 7116, FTC, November 1, 1961, at p. 6.
"Ibid. "Id. at p. 8.
61 Ibid. 67 Ibid.
"Id. at p. 8 n.8.
"Like the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, see note 47 supra,
the trial staff of the Federal Trade Commission takes the position that
vertical closed territorial arrangements are per se illegal. As stated by the
Chief of the Division of General Trade Restraints of the Commission:
"Regardless of economic necessity, agreements to divide a market even as to
a single product must be struck down as illegal per se." Address by Rufus
E. Wilson, The Federal Bar Association and The Foundation of the Federal
Bar Association Briefing Conference on Antitrust Laws and Trade Regula-
tions, January 5, 1962.
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GEOGRAPHICAL CUSTOMER ALLOCATION
The status of geographical customer allocations has been the
subject of recent conflicting decisions which may soon be resolved.
The eighth count in Reliable" charged that plaintiff was unable
to procure Volkswagen products following the termination of its
franchise as a result of agreements that the distributors would sell
Volkswagen products only to franchised dealers within their desig-
nated exclusive territories. In considering defendants' motion to
dismiss this count the court stated the initial question, in the absence
of allegations of public injury, to be whether the complaint stated a
per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Judge Forman
noted that, whereas in United States v. Volkswagen of America
the government took the position that the territorial agreements and
franchise system of marketing were devised to implement a con-
spiracy to fix prices, Reliable contained no such allegations or any
allegation of practices "concededly illegal per se."7' The court quoted
with approval the language in Schwing to the effect that exclusive
territorial arrangements by definition involve a "limited monopoly"
to sell the manufacturer's product within the assigned territory, and
approved the conclusion of Schwing that such exclusive agency
agreements are nevertheless not per se illegal. 2 In spite of the fact
that compared to Schwing and Packard, the present case involved
additional steps in the distribution channel between the manufacturer
and the dealer, i.e., the product passed from the manufacturer
through its exclusive importer to the distributor, the court was not
persuaded that this system should constitute a per se violation of the
Sherman Act.
Perhaps if the decision rested at this point the holding would
clearly stand for the proposition that closed territory arrangements
between a manufacturer, his distributors and dealers must be judged
by the Rule of Reason. Unfortunately Judge Forman added, almost
parenthetically, that in its present posture the case presented only
a unilateral refusal to deal."3 This apparent reference to the Colgate
doctrine dilutes his statement that such agreements are not illegal
per se. On the facts as alleged it is difficult to understand why the
Colgate doctrine should even be raised in considering this count in-
"o Reliable Volkswagen Sales & Serv. Co. v. World-Wide Automobile
Corp., 182 F. Supp. 412 (D.N.J. 1960).




asmuch as the complaint specifically alleged a vertical agreement
between the manufacturer, his exclusive importer and distributors to
abide by the territorial restrictions. It would appear that this single
unrelated statement may have been an unfortunate afterthought
which portends considerable weakening of the decision as precedent.
In United States v. White Motor Co.,74 the first case dealing
with exclusive territorial arrangements to be litigated by the Justice
Department, the defendant truck manufacturer was charged with
conspiring with its dealers and distributors in violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act by entering into agreements providing that
(1) each distributor and dealer was to sell White trucks only to
dealers or other buyers having a place of business or purchasing head-
quarters within his assigned territory, and if he sold outside such
assigned territory he was to pay certain sums of money to the dealer
or distributor in whose territory such White trucks were first
registered or placed in initial service; (2) distributors and dealers
were not to sell White trucks to others for resale or to any federal
or state government or any department or political subdivision
thereof, such sales being reserved exclusively to White for direct
sales; and (3) distributors were to sell to dealers and distributors
and dealers were to sell to customers designated by White as Na-
tional Accounts, Fleet Accounts, and to federal and state govern-
ments at prices fixed by White. White was a party to all selling
agreements with distributors and direct dealers as well as selling
agreements between its distributors and their dealers, using standard
form selling agreements in each instance.
The government sought an injunction against each of these
practices and, on motion for summary judgment, defendant admitted
most factual allegations but denied all charges of illegality. The
court first found that defendant's resale price maintenance was a
per se violation of the Sherman Act. The government contended
that the allocation of territories and customers must also be illegal
per se when combined with the allegedly per se illegal price fixing
agreements "as all elements of competition among the various selling
units involved are thereby eliminated." 5 However, the court did
not feel that it had to rely on this "guilt by association" theory in
concluding that these practices are also per se illegal. In so holding,
"' 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961), appeal filed, 30 U.S.L. WEEK
3228 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1961) (No. 619).
I Id. at 577.
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it rejected White's argument that it should be allowed to introduce
evidence to show that these practices do not unreasonably restrain
trade and that enjoning them would reduce, rather than foster, com-
petition in the sale of motor trucks.
The court noted the distinction between exclusive selling arrange-
ments and, as in this case, agreements that distributors and dealers
will not sell to anyone located outside of their assigned territories.
While recognizing the legality of exclusive selling agreements, it
concluded that the Supreme Court has "consistently" held that alloca-
tion of markets among competitors violates the Sherman Act."0 The
court attempted a superficial survey of cases to support this con-
clusion without making any attempt to distinguish between the
horizontal nature of the cases relied on and the vertical arrangements
at issue.
The reliance on cases involving horizontal agreements between
competitors to allocate markets among themselves might be thought
to support an inference that the court was deciding the case on the
basis of the horizontal nature of the agreements between White and
its distributors and dealers, inasmuch as White was said to be com-
peting with its distributors and dealers in selling to certain cus-
tomers, viz., so-called "National Accounts" and "Government Ac-
counts." Similarly, in distinguishing Schwing it was noted that
the court there recognized that a horizontal conspiracy between
competitors would be illegal.7" However, the court makes it clear
that it thinks a series of vertical agreements dividing markets stands
on the same footing as vertical price fixing agreements under Dr.
Miles, stating: 7'
White can fare no better in a system of identical contracts with
its distributors and dealers allocating territories and cus-
tomers than could the distributors and dealers themselves "if
they formed a combination and endeavored to establish the
same restrictions, and thus to achieve the same result, by
agreement with each other."
While the district court's language seems to hold that all
geographical customer allocations are illegal per se, whether vertical
or horizontal, the Supreme Court might not get to this issue by
interpreting the decision in light of the peculiar factual situation
16 Id. at 578. '1 Id. at 582. '" Id. at 585.
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involved. Thus, the holding might be left standing on the basis
of the horizontal nature of the agreements or because the customer
allocations "buttressed" White's resale price maintenance, or both.
It can only be hoped that the Supreme Court will take this oppor-
tunity to shed some light on the question whether the per se doctrine
should be extended to cover vertical geographical customer alloca-
tion arrangements.79
The Federal Trade Commission upheld customer allocations in
Roux Distrib. Co.80 Respondent reclassified all of its wholesale
customers into three categories. Some of the wholesalers had
previously sold to accounts in more than one such category and
respondent required each wholesaler to choose one classification and
to agree to sell only to accounts specified therein. The three classi-
fications and their respective customer allocations were as follows :1
1. Jobber--one who subjobs, sells to, trades or exchanges
Roux products with drug wholesalers or beauty supply
dealers or other jobbers.
2. Drug wholesaler-one who sells Roux products to drug
stores, toilet goods counters of department stores and
similar retailers only.
3. Beauty supply dealers-one who sells Roux products to
beauty salons, beauty schools and beauty operators only.
Respondent "vigorously enforced" these classifications and dis-
continued selling to any wholesaler who sold outside of his desig-
nated classification.8 In dismissing, the hearing examiner had
relied on the Colgate doctrine, holding the practices at issue involved
nothing more than unilateral refusals to sell." On appeal, however,
Commissioner Anderson, speaking for the Commission, stated that
In granting summary judgment on the theory that the challenged
practices are each per se violations of the Sherman Act, Judge Kalbfleisch in
White stated that he was merely performing his function as a trial judge
in interpreting and applying the law. He indicated that the decision did not
"necessarily reflect his personal attitude or philosophy upon the subject,"
but thought that "arguments as to the business necessity of agreements of
this type must be addressed to the Congress rather than to the Courts."
Id. at 588. Several bills which would permit the assignment of "protected"
territories in automobile dealer franchise contracts have been introduced
during recent sessions of Congress, but none has been enacted. See, e.g.,
S. 997, S. 2042, S. 2047, S. 2151, and H.R. 881, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959)
(S. 997 covered "complex mechanical products"); H.R. 10201, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1960); H.R. 1212, and H.R. 1215, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
"55 F.T.C. 1386 (1959). 8Id. at 1386-87.
"Id. at 1387. 83 Ibid.
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the issue was clearly the "more fundamental" question whether a
manufacturer could place such restrictions on the resale of its
products. 4 While recognizing that allocation of customers of a
purchaser would "under some circumstances" violate both the
Sherman and FTC Acts, "particularly" where an integral part of
a price fixing scheme per Bausch & Lomb, the Commission rejected
the per se approach, concluding that even under the broader reach of
section 5 there must be evidence of anticompetitive effects. s5
More recently, in International Staple & Mach. Co.,s" respondent
was charged with an illegal method of distribution which contained
multiple restrictions on its distributors and dealers. The complaint
charged that respondent had violated section 3 of the Clayton Act
and section 5 of the FTC Act by exclusive dealing arrangements
wherein its distributors and dealers were restrained from using or
dealing in competitors' products, and section 5 by geographical
customer allocations. Where a distributor sold in his territory with
subsequent shipment into another's closed territory he was expected
to split the sales profit with the latter.8 7  Without citing a single
case in support of its finding, the hearing examiner concluded that
respondent's geographical customer allocation "has had the tendency,
capacity, or effect of obstructing, hindering and preventing compe-
tition in the sale of respondent's wide crown staples and wide crown
stapling machines."" s The Commission adopted the initial decision
without modification or comment.' The theory of the decision
again was that such practices precluded competition between dealers
in respondent's products, the same as if the dealers had so agreed
between themselves."
In Sandura Co., 1 now pending appeal before the Commission, the
hearing examiner found that respondent had violated section 5 as
charged by its use of resale price maintenance, closed territories, and
customer allocation. Respondent sold its vinyl floor and wall cover-
ings through a franchise system by which it appointed distributors
8 Id. at 1387-88. sr Id. at 1388.
" No. 8083, FTC, September 21, 1961.
"' Commission's Exhibits 30A-B, 32A-C, and 75A-C. See also Commis-
sion's proposed finding number 18, and respondent's proposed findings number
8 and 11.
International Staple & Mach. Co., No. 8083, FTC, September 21, 1961,
atp. 6.
8' Commission Decision, No. 8083, FTC, November 7, 1961.9oId. at p. 5.91 No. 7042, FTC, September 15, 1961.
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to closed territories and required these exclusive distributors to
sell only to designated "franchised" dealers located within the dis-
tributor's closed territory. By the interrelation of respondent's
dealer franchise system with its distributor franchise system, the
examiner found that a dealer had to do business with the distributor
in whose territory he was located." The examiner rejected re-
spondent's contention that the system was voluntary and therefore
within the Colgate refusal to deal exception, and found that the
practices do, in fact, involve mutual undertakings or agreements re-
quiring the distributors to stay within their assigned territories
except to the extent that there may be territory which has not been
assigned to another distributor.13  According to the examiner,
respondent's closed territories were necessary to help it maintain
its suggested resale prices.94
Respondent had experienced difficulty getting established in the
industry and claimed that its exclusive franchise system enabled it
to compete more effectively with its larger established competitors.
This system was said to encourage the distributors to share burden-
some advertising costs and to more aggressively promote respond-
ent's products within their assigned territories.9 5 The examiner
was content, however, to find the necessary injury to competition in
the elimination of intra-brand competition between respondent's
distributors, even assuming that there had been no lessening of inter-
brand competition in the industry and, in fact, that respondent
thereby strengthened its position vis-a-vis its larger competitors.
The examiner held respondent's distribution system illegal per se
on the basis of White, rejecting respondent's attempt to distinguish
White on the ground that defendant there was in partial competition
with its distributors, holding that this was not the basis of the court's
holding and, moreover, that respondent was also in partial competi-
tion with its distributors in its sales to mail order houses.9 In any
event, the examiner refused to distinguish between horizontal and
vertical geographical allocation of customers under the reasoning of
Dr. Miles, holding both to be per se illegal."5
92 Id. at p. 23. 93 Id. at p. 28.
91 Id. at p. 24. '5 Id. at p. 30.
'
8 Id. at p. 32. 9 TId. at p. 34.
8 Id. at pp. 35-36. The examiner attempted to distinguish Roux on the
basis of a statement in Roberts Co., No. 6943, FTC, March 17, 1959, at p. 12,
to the effect that "the Roux case was not premised upon a charge of con-
spiracy or agreement." Sandura Co., No. 7042, FTC, September 15, 1961,
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CONCLUSION
It is readily discernible from the above review that the enigmatic
status of exclusive territorial arrangements under the antitrust laws
is mainly the result of unclear, if not hopelessly tangled, decisions.
As a starting point for cutting the Gordian knot, it is suggested
that the courts and the Commission take a more critical look at the
facts of each case to determine the real purposes and effects of the
subject restraint. There are substantial differences in the extent of
the restraint involved in exclusive selling, closed territories and
geographical customer allocation. In exclusive selling, the seller
agrees not to sell to another in the exclusive distributor's assigned
territory. The restraint on the distributor is greater in closed terri-
tories in that not only must his place of business be restricted to his
own territory, but he must not promote or make sales in another's
closed territory. The restriction on the distributor is complete when
it is added, under geographical customer allocation, that he cannot
sell to anyone residing outside his own territory. While the courts
and the Commission have uniformly conceded that exclusive selling
is "virtually per se legal," the latter two categories are still in doubt.
The basic argument advanced by advocates of the per se illegal
approach to territorial restraints on distributors is founded on the
reasoning of Dr. Miles. In striking down Dr. Miles' policy of
vertical resale price maintenance the Supreme Court noted the per se
illegality of horizontal resale price fixing and, referring to the vertical
nature of the agreements at issue, stated :
As to this, the complainant [Dr. Miles] can fare no better
with its plan of identical contracts than could the dealers
themselves if they formed a combination and endeavored
to establish the same restrictions, and thus to achieve the
same result, by agreement with each other. If the immediate
advantage they would thus obtain would not be sufficient to
sustain such a direct agreement, the asserted ulterior benefit
at p. 40. The examiner failed to note that Roberts had pointed out that "the
facts in [Roux] are far removed from those [in Roberts]." In addition,
as already noted above, the complaint in Roux specifically charged "that
respondent has required its wholesale customers to agree to restrict their
sales to a limited class of accounts." 55 F.T.C. at 1386.




to the complainant can not be regarded as sufficient to support
its system.
But agreements or combinations between dealers, having
for their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the
fixing of prices, are injurious to the public interest and void.
They are not saved by the advantages which the participants
expect to derive from the enhanced price to the consumer.
The applicability of this line of reasoning to vertical territorial
restraints on distributors may at first blush seem inescapable. How-
ever, proponents of the analogy either fail to recognize or choose
to disregard the obvious difference in the effects of price fixing and
territorial restraints. Resale price fixing not only restrains intra-
brand competition but may also restrain inter-brand price competition
by depriving the distributor of sufficient pricing flexibility to com-
pete effectively with price competition of rival brands. Thus, in an
attempt to concentrate on inter-brand competition the manufacturer
may unwittingly deny to his distributors an essential competitive
weapon. On the other hand, in vertical allocation of territories and
customers the distributor has retained all competitive tools, price
and non-price, to compete effectively with rival brands. Whereas
price fixing necessarily puts a brake on "competition" in the broad
inter-brand sense, such exclusive territorial arrangements may in
fact augment competition. Therefore, there is nothing in Dr. Miles,
to borrow a phrase from Holmes' dissent,' 0 "that by ineluctable
logic requires the conclusion" that vertical exclusive territorial
arrangements are per se illegal. Indeed, the differences in the
nature of the territorial restraints require the application of the Rule
of Reason to determine their effect on competition in each instance.
Assuming that the per se approach is rejected, there remains the
vital question of what tests of reasonableness should apply to terri-
torial restraints. It has been shown that territorial restrictions of
this nature are in effect elements of vertical integration by contract.
Logically then it would seem that the proper tests should be similar
to those applied under the Rule of Reason in vertical integration
through mergers. The qualitative approach of the Rule of Reason
should include a consideration of structural and functional perform-
ance factors such as those suggested in United States v. Columbia
... Id. at 411.
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Steel Co.' 01 and reiterated in Times Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States,102 i.e., "the percentage of business controlled, the
strength of the remaining competition [at the buyer and seller levels
and] whether the action springs from business requirements or
purpose to monopolize."
Having arrived at the proper qualitative method of examination,
there remains the question of what standard of proof should be
required-the Sherman Act requirement of undue restraint, absent
monopolization or a purpose to monopolize, or the incipiency test of
section 5 of the FTC Act. Initially, it would be preferable to adopt
a monolithic standard by a coalescence of those under the applicable
antitrust laws. Guilt or innocence should not hinge on who decides
the case-the courts or the Commission. Perhaps it would be too
much to expect the Commission to abdicate the broader reach of
section 5, but it should at least require a showing of a reasonable
probability that the practice would have the proscribed adverse effect
on competition.
Perhaps most importantly, the relevant market and line of com-
merce must be defined by considering competition at each level of
distribution. Whether the line of commerce is established by de-
termining a product's "peculiar characteristics and uses,"'08 or its
"reasonable interchangeability"' 0 ' with competing products, the im-
334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948).
102 345 U.S. 594, 615 (1953). This is the test advocated under the merger
analogy by THE REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMIT-
TEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 28 (1955). Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), stated
the relevant factors to be considered in applying the Rule of Reason as
follows: "The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it
is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question, the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business
to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint, and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopt-
ing the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent
may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences." See gen-
erally Montague, "Per Se Illegality" and the Ride of Reason, 12 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST SEcTION 69 (1958).
10. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957). Cf. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.,
259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
... See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 3'7
(1956). Cf. Union Carbide Corp., No. 6826, FTC, September 25, 1961.
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portant test should be whether the practice tends unreasonably to
restrain competition between competing brands of the relevant
product-without restricting the inquiry to effects on intra-brand
competition in which each manufacturer has a "natural monopoly."'10 5
It is possible that out of the pending litigation there may come
some order to the chaotic status of vertical territorial arrangements.
The Supreme Court, in considering the appeal in White, and the
Commission, in the pending appeal in Sandura, have the opportunity
to clarify the law. However, the question regarding the legality
of such territorial arrangements may be avoided again by em-
phasizing the alleged horizontal nature of the restraints, or by finding
a single over-all method of competition involving illegal price fixing
as well as vertical territorial restrictions. Either or both of these
factors may so color any forthcoming decision as to render it value-
less on the single issue of exclusive territories. As a final observa-
tion, it might be worth mentioning that although there is ample
precedent for enjoining legal with illegal practices where they are
common elements of the same method of distribution, it by no means
is compulsory that such be the result indiscriminately, and the policy
of our antitrust laws may militate against throwing out the baby with
the bath.
°See CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COmPETITION (7th
ed. 1956). Cf. United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y.
1957), judgment vacated on motion of the United States, 172 F. Supp. 107
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), (defendant's own trademarked perfumes held to constitute
relevant market).
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